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NOTES
TAX LAW—HAVING YOUR CAKE AND EATING IT TOO1: SECTION
1433(B)(2)(A) OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986: EFFECTING AN
EXCEPTION WHERE ONE DOES NOT EXIST
INTRODUCTION
In 1986, Congress eliminated an estate-tax loophole that tax-
payers had exploited through the use of generation-skipping trans-
fers.2  A generation-skipping transfer provides the present
enjoyment of property in trust to intermediate generations3 and
transfers the remainder beneficiary interest to persons more than
one generation below the transferor.4  Today, nearly twenty-five
years later, two circuit courts of appeals continue to allow taxpayers
to escape generation-skipping transfer-tax liability through the use
of a general power of appointment.5  This Note explores how and
why these circuits continue to allow taxpayers to use generation-
skipping transfers to circumvent tax liability.
Benjamin S. Gerson married his wife, Eleanor, on November
6, 1938; they remained married until Mr. Gerson’s death thirty-five
years later.6  In December of 1968, Mr. Gerson executed a revoca-
1. Readers may ascribe more than one meaning to this proverb.  However, in this
context, it means taking advantage of a particular thing and, then, after that thing is no
longer available, still attempting to benefit from or use it.
2. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–514, § 1433(b)(2)(A), 100 Stat.
2085, 2731 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 2601 note (2006) (Effective Date of 1986
Amendment)).
3. The intermediate generation is the set of beneficiaries one generation below
the transferor. See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, PRINCIPLES
OF WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES MCGOVERN & KURTZ § 15.4,  at 430-31 (2005).
4. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 2611-13.  A generation-skipping transfer may also be effected
by directly transferring property to a beneficiary two or more generations below the
transferor. See id. §§ 2612(c)(1), 2613(a)(1).
5. See Bachler v. United States, 281 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
exercising a general power of appointment over a trust that otherwise meets the re-
quirements of § 1433(b)(2)(A) does not remove the trust from the scope of the excep-
tion); Simpson v. United States, 183 F.3d 812, 816 (8th Cir. 1999) (same).
6. Estate of Gerson v. Comm’r, 127 T.C. 139, 140 (2006), aff’d, 507 F.3d 435 (6th
Cir. 2007).
515
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ble trust,7 known as the Benjamin Gerson Trust.8  On July 19, 1973
Mr. Gerson executed the third and final amendment to this trust.9
Mr. Gerson died three days later; his death rendered the Benjamin
Gerson Trust irrevocable.10  He was survived by his wife, four chil-
dren, and five grandchildren.11
The Benjamin Gerson Trust provided for the trust property to
be divided into three trusts.12  One of those three trusts was at is-
sue—a marital trust that was formed for the benefit of Mrs. Ger-
son.13  Additionally, the marital trust granted Mrs. Gerson a
general power of appointment,14 which allowed her to dispose of
the marital trust property as she desired.15
7. In general, a trust is an instrument that creates a right of “beneficial enjoyment
[in] property to which another person holds the legal title.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1647 (9th ed. 2009).  The settlor contributes property to the trust, which is overseen by
the trustee, who maintains an interest in the property for the benefit of the beneficiary.
Id.; see MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 3, § 4.6, at 118-19.  “[T]he term ‘trust’ as used R
in the Internal Revenue Code refers to an arrangement created either by a will or by an
inter vivos declaration whereby trustees take title to property for the purpose of pro-
tecting or conserving it for the beneficiaries . . . .”  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701–4(a) (as
amended in 1996).  The term “trust” in the generation-skipping transfer-tax context has
a broader meaning than under section 7701. CAROL A. HARRINGTON, LLOYD LEVA
PLAINE & HOWARD M. ZARITSKY, GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX ¶ 2.03[1], at
2-18 (2d ed. 2001).  For generation-skipping transfer tax purposes, “any arrangement
(other than an estate) that has substantially the same effect as a trust, such as a life
estate, remainder interest, estate for years, insurance, and annuity contracts” is consid-
ered a trust. Id.  A revocable trust enables the settlor to revoke the trust without the
consent of the trustee or beneficiary. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103(14) (2005).  Conversely,
an irrevocable trust is one “that cannot be terminated by the settlor.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1651 (9th ed. 2009).
8. Estate of Gerson, 127 T.C. at 140.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. The holder of a power of appointment has authority to designate recipients of
the trust property. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.1
(1986); see UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103(3)(b) (2005).  The U.S. Code defines a general
power of appointment as “a power which is exercisable in favor of the decedent, his
estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate.”  26 U.S.C. § 2041(b)(1) (2006).  In
general, the holder of a power of appointment has authority to dictate to whom to
assign trust property. See id.
15. Estate of Gerson, 127 T.C. at 140.
Upon the death of my said wife, the balance remaining in Trust A [the marital
trust], including any income therein received by the Trustee from the time of
the last income payment and the date of death of my said wife, shall be distrib-
uted by the Trustee to such person or persons, and in such share or shares, in
trust or otherwise, as my said wife shall, by her Last Will and Testament, or
Codicil thereto, appoint by specific reference thereto.  It is my intention that
my said wife shall have an unlimited testamentary power of appointment in
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Mrs. Gerson executed her will and created a revocable trust—
the Eleanor Gerson Trust—on September 24, 1999.16  Five weeks
before her death, she amended her will and the Eleanor Gerson
Trust.17  In this amendment, she exercised her power of appoint-
ment in the marital trust in favor of her grandchildren through the
Eleanor Gerson Trust.18
Upon her death, Mrs. Gerson’s estate filed a tax return claim-
ing that the trust formed for the benefit of the Gersons’ grandchil-
dren was exempt from the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax
(GSTT).19  The government imposes the GSTT on property trans-
fers that skip at least one generation between the transferor and
beneficiary.20  The estate made its claim contrary to promulgated
respect of the whole of Trust A, including the power to appoint the same in
favor of her own estate.
Id.
16. Id. at 141.
17. Id.
18. Id.
Under the terms of a certain Trust Agreement dated December 9, 1968, en-
tered into between my spouse, BENJAMIN S. GERSON, AND NATIONAL
CITY BANK, . . . I am granted a general power to appoint at the time of my
death the property held in Trust A of my said spouse’s Trust Agreement.  I
hereby exercise said power of appointment and direct that all property subject
thereto shall be allocated to NATIONAL CITY BANK, Trustee, or any suc-
cessor thereto, under my said 1999 Amended and Restated Revocable Trust
Agreement, to be administered pursuant to the terms of ARTICLE III thereof
(the Grandchildren’s Trust) for the benefit of my grandchildren and more re-
mote descendants.
Id.  The Grandchildren’s Trust divided the trust property “into five equal shares for the
benefit of each [grandchild].” Id.  Two grandchildren received their shares outright. Id.
The shares of the remaining three grandchildren were held in trust, to be transferred to
each upon the earlier of their reaching forty years of age or the twenty-first anniversary
of Mrs. Gerson’s death less one day. Id.
19. Id.  The value of the trust at Mrs. Gerson’s death was $6,244,627.16. Id.  The
estate reported a federal estate tax of $7,168,531.02, which did not include the tax for
the generation-skipping transfer that the commissioner later claimed a deficiency
against. Id. at 142.
20. See MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 3, § 15.4, at 428-29.  The GSTT R
removes many of the tax incentives of creating trusts that allocate income to intermedi-
ary generations and then disperse the property to skip persons. Id.  See infra note 54 R
for an explanation of “skip person.”
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tax regulations.21  Unsurprisingly, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue issued Mrs. Gerson’s estate a deficiency of $1,144,465.22
Estate of Gerson v. Commissioner23 is the latest case to address
the reading and application of section 1433(b)(2)(A)24 of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (the “1986 Act”).25  The 1986 Act contains
three exceptions to the GSTT: (1) section 1433(b)(2)(A) exempts
generation-skipping transfers under trusts that were irrevocable on
September 25, 1985; (2) section 1433(b)(2)(B) exempts generation-
skipping transfers under wills executed before the enactment of the
1986 Act if the decedent died prior to January 1, 1987; and (3) sec-
tion 1433(b)(2)(C) exempts generation-skipping transfers under
trusts where the grantor was under mental disability continuously
from the date of enactment until the date of the grantor’s death.26
The Sixth Circuit and other federal courts of appeals have
wrestled with the problem of how the GSTT grandfather exception
should treat a general power of appointment in a trust that other-
wise satisfies section 1433(b)(2)(A).27  The Eighth and Ninth Cir-
cuits held that the grandfather exception’s plain meaning dictates
that exercising a general power of appointment over a trust that
otherwise meets the requirement of section 1433(b)(2)(A) does not
remove the trust from the scope of the exception.28  At the other
21. Estate of Gerson, 127 T.C. at 141.  The Internal Revenue Service promulgated
Treasury Regulation section 26.2601–1(b)(1)(i), which states “that the grandfather ex-
ception ‘does not apply to a transfer of property pursuant to the exercise, release, or
lapse of a general power of appointment that is treated as a taxable transfer under
chapter 11 or chapter 12 [of the United States Internal Revenue Code].’”  Estate of
Gerson v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 435, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Treas. Reg.
§ 26.2601–1(b)(1)(i)).
22. Estate of Gerson, 127 T.C. at 139.
23. Estate of Gerson, 507 F.3d 435.
24. This Note commonly refers to the section as the “grandfather exception,” or
simply, the “exception.”
25. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–514, § 1433(b)(2)(A), 100 Stat. 2085,
2731 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 2601 note (2006) (Effective Date of 1986 Amendment));
Eric G. Lanning, The Service Visits the Sins of the Grandfathers upon the Grandchildren:
The Application of the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax to Grandfathered Irrevocable
Trusts That Include General Powers of Appointment, 34 MICH. TAX LAW. 11, 11-12
(2008). See generally Estate of Gerson, 507 F.3d 435 (addressing grandfather exception
in 2007); Bachler v. United States, 281 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2002) (addressing exception
in 2002); Simpson v. United States, 183 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 1999) (addressing exception
in 1999); E. Norman Peterson Marital Trust v. Comm’r, 78 F.3d 795 (2d Cir. 1996)
(addressing exception in 1996).
26. Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 1433(b)(2).
27. See Estate of Gerson, 507 F.3d at 439; Bachler, 281 F.3d at 1079-80; Simpson,
183 F.3d at 813-15; Peterson, 78 F.3d at 798-99; Lanning, supra note 25, at 11. R
28. Bachler, 281 F.3d at 1080; Simpson, 183 F.3d at 813.
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end of the spectrum, the Second and Sixth Circuits found that the
grandfather exception was ambiguous and stated that Treasury
Regulation § 26.2601–1 correctly interprets section 1433(b)(2)
(A).29  Treasury Regulation § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(i) removes trusts
that incorporate a general power of appointment, whether exer-
cised or lapsed, from section 1433(b)(2)(A).30
This Note argues that (1) the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ hold-
ings are contrary to the wealth-transfer tax and generation-skipping
tax schemes, (2) Treasury Regulation § 26.2601–1 correctly inter-
prets section 1433(b)(2)(A), and (3) Congress could not have in-
tended for the grandfather exception to apply to irrevocable trusts
accompanied by a general power of appointment when it promul-
gated section 1433(b)(2)(A) of the 1986 Tax Reform Act.  The ex-
ception’s September 25, 1985 effective date is nearly twenty-five
years old and a new generation has been born.  This new generation
can now receive the trust property by the holder of a general power
of appointment even when the underlying trust did not contemplate
a generation-skipping transfer.  Reading the grandfather exception
along with the statute’s other exceptions reveals that Congress did
not intend to permit taxpayers to continue benefiting from a tax
advantage that it had every intention of eliminating in the 1986 Act.
Part I of this Note provides background on the estate tax, gift
tax, and the GSTT.  Part II focuses on the history and purpose be-
hind section 1433(b)(2)(A) and the development of Treasury Regu-
lation § 26.2601–1.  Part III examines the application of section
1433(b)(2)(A) to general powers of appointment by comparing the
holdings of the Second and Sixth Circuits and those of the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits.  Finally, Part IV demonstrates that Treasury
Regulation § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(i) comports with the GSTT scheme
and addresses the shortcomings of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’
holdings.
29. Estate of Gerson, 507 F.3d at 436; Peterson, 78 F.3d at 796.  The Second Cir-
cuit followed Temporary Treasury Regulation § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(v)(A), which is now
Treasury Regulation § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(v)(A). See Treas. Reg. § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(v)(A)
(as amended 2004).
30. See Treas. Reg. § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(i); T.D. 8912, 2001–1 C.B. 452.
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN WEALTH-TRANSFER
TAX SYSTEM
A. From Death Tax to Wealth-Transfer Tax
The roots of the death tax are deep and its primitive form can
be traced back to the Egyptians, Romans, and Greeks.31  The death
tax, commonly known today as an estate or inheritance tax, is an
excise tax on the privilege of transmitting or receiving property at
the time of death.32  The estate tax is calculated based on the value
of the decedent’s estate.33  The inheritance tax is measured by the
value of property received by the recipient.34
Early in our nation’s history, wealth-transfer taxes were im-
posed primarily as a means to generate revenue in times of war.35
The earliest American transfer tax was the Stamp Act of 1797.36
This act taxed wills in probate in an effort to generate revenue to
build the United States Navy in response to French attacks on
American ships.37  The Act was short lived, lasting only five years
before Congress repealed it, but its effect resonated as similar taxes
were later legislated to raise revenue in times of war.38
31. Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 223,
223 (1956).
32. JOHN K. MCNULTY & GRAYSON M.P. MCCOUCH, FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAXATION 1 (6th ed. 2003).  The estate tax taxes the transmission of property at
the time of death, whereas the inheritance tax taxes the receipt of property from the
deceased. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 3.
36. Stamp Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 527 (laying duties on stamped vellum,
parchment, and paper); MCNULTY & MCCOUCH, supra note 32, at 3. The Stamp Act of R
1797 is believed to be the first death tax imposed within the United States.  Mary R.
Wampler, Repealing the Federal Estate Tax: Death to the Death Tax, or Will Reform Save
the Day?, 25 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 525, 529 (2001).
37. MCNULTY & MCCOUCH, supra note 32, at 3; Wampler, supra note 36, 529-30 R
(taxation of wills in probate taxed the beneficiary, not the deceased, and the Act pro-
vided for tax exemptions to the decedent’s widow, children, and grandchildren); see
also Eisenstein, supra note 31, at 225. R
38. J.D. Trout & Shahid A. Buttar, Resurrecting “Death Taxes”: Inheritance, Re-
distribution, and the Science of Happiness, 16 J.L. & POL. 765, 777 (2000); see also Wam-
pler, supra note 36, at 530.  Congress enacted the Tax Act of 1862 in response to the R
Civil War and enacted the War Revenue Act of 1898 in response to the Spanish-Ameri-
can War. Id.  Each was repealed at the conclusion of the war. Id. at 530-31.
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1. The Birth of the Estate Tax and Gift Tax
In response to World War I and the need to raise revenue once
again, Congress enacted the first estate tax in 1916.39  The estate tax
differed from death taxes by taxing the right to transfer ownership
of property at death, effectively taxing the decedent rather than the
beneficiary.40  Unlike death taxes, the estate tax remained in effect
after the conclusion of World War I.41
The estate tax was amended in 1918 to increase revenue and to
close loopholes.42  As a part of the 1918 amendment, Congress ex-
tended the estate tax to property subject to an exercise of “a gen-
eral power of appointment over it, equating the power of
disposition with ownership of the property.”43  This amendment in-
herently laid the groundwork for future transfer-tax
modifications.44
Congress’s work in the 1918 amendments did little to protect
its taxation efforts because wealthy individuals discovered that the
estate tax could be avoided by inter vivos gifting.45  Congress real-
ized that that estate tax could not be effectively enforced without a
gift tax, for without the protective nature of the gift tax, it would be
too easy to eliminate the transfer of property at death through the
use of lifetime gifts.46  Recognizing that Americans were avoiding
the estate tax system, Congress enacted the federal gift tax as gap-
39. MCNULTY & MCCOUCH, supra note 32, at 3; Nina R. Bohan, Proposed Regu- R
lations Applying Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax to Nonresident Aliens Go Too Far,
19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 473, 481 (1996); see Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No.
64–271, 39 Stat. 756.  The estate tax taxed the wealthy, initially allowing a $50,000 ex-
emption.  Eisenstein, supra note 31, at 230.  The constitutionality of the estate tax was R
upheld by the Supreme Court in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner in 1921.  N.Y. Trust Co.
v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921); MCNULTY & MCCOUCH, supra note 32, at 3. R
40. Wampler, supra note 36, at 531.  Congress foresaw that taxpayers would at- R
tempt to avoid the tax.  John T. Gaubatz, A Generation-Shifting Transfer Tax, 12 VA.
TAX REV. 1, 4-5 (1992).  Therefore, in enacting the first estate tax Congress ensured
that the tax was assessed on all the property owned by the decedent at death, including
transfers made in contemplation of death, transfers intended to be made after death,
and property owned by the decedent jointly with another person. Id.
41. Bohan, supra note 39, at 482-83. R
42. Gaubatz, supra note 40, at 5; see Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65–254, R
§ 401, 40 Stat. 1057, 1096 (1919).
43. Gaubatz, supra note 40, at 5 (citations omitted). R
44. Id. at 7.
45. Christopher E. Erblich, To Bury Federal Transfer Taxes Without Further
Adieu, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1931, 1932 (1994).
46. Sanford’s Estate v. Comm’r, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939); see MCNULTY & MC-
COUCH, supra note 32, at 4. R
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filling legislation in the Revenue Act of 1924.47  The gift tax served
as a companion to the estate tax.48  Its purpose was to protect the
integrity of the estate tax.49  To this end, the gift tax continues to be
a partner to the estate tax today.50
2. The Implementation of the Generation-Skipping Transfer
Tax
The public policy underlying the GSTT is akin to the policy for
enacting the gift tax—“to bring uniformity and consistency to Fed-
eral transfer taxes . . . by imposing a transfer tax upon all transfers”
that detrimentally seek to evade the estate tax.51  In 1976, Congress
overhauled the federal wealth-transfer tax system.52  The Tax Re-
form Act of 1976 (the “1976 Act”) merged the estate tax and gift
tax and created a unified framework for taxing the transfer of prop-
erty.53  Under the 1976 Act, Congress closed a loophole that al-
lowed for the transfer of property from one generation to a person
at least two generations below the transferor—termed a skip per-
son.54  This type of transfer bypassed taxation upon the death of the
47. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68–176, § 319, 43 Stat. 253, 313; MCNULTY
& MCCOUCH, supra note 32, at 4; Gaubatz, supra note 40, at 7-8. R
48. Sanford’s Estate, 308 U.S. at 44.
49. Mitchell M. Gans & Jay A. Soled, Reforming the Gift Tax and Making It En-
forceable, 87 B.U. L. REV. 759, 761 (2007).  The gift tax also functions as a backstop to
the income tax.  Crown v. Comm’r, 585 F.2d 234, 235 (7th Cir. 1978).
50. MCNULTY & MCCOUCH, supra note 32, at 4; Gans & Soled, supra note 49, at R
762.  This first iteration of the gift tax was repealed two years later but then reinstated
in 1932. See Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72–154, § 501(a), 47 Stat. 169, 245.
51. Estate of Gerson v. Comm’r, 127 T.C. 139, 142 (2006), aff’d, 507 F.3d 435 (6th
Cir. 2007); see also H.R. REP. NO. 99–426, at 824 (1985); E. Norman Peterson Marital
Trust v. Comm’r, 78 F.3d 795, 796 (2d Cir. 1996).
52. JOHN R. LUCKEY, A HISTORY OF FEDERAL ESTATE, GIFT, AND GENERA-
TION-SKIPPING TAXES 11 (2001), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/
10207/bitstreams/270.pdf; see MCNULTY & MCCOUCH, supra note 32, at 6. R
53. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–455, 90 Stat. 1520; LUCKEY, supra
note 52, at 12.  The Tax Reform Act of 1976 unified the gift and estate tax by creating a R
single tax table for transfers occurring during life and death.  Erblich, supra note 45, at R
1932.
54. See Bohan, supra note 39, at 486-87.  A skip person in the context of trusts is R
“a natural person assigned to a generation which is [two] or more generations below the
generation assignment of the transferor.”  26 U.S.C. § 2613(a)(1) (2006).  A typical
skip-person relationship is formed when grandparents transfer property to their
grandchild, skipping the intermediate generation of the grandparent’s child. See MC-
GOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 3, at 430-31.  The loophole was typically exploited by R
creating a trust that paid income to the creator’s child for the child’s life and at the
child’s death transferred the remainder of the trust property to the grandchild without
subjecting the property to an estate tax on the transfer to the grandchild. MCNULTY &
MCCOUCH, supra note 32, at 7.  “Prior to the 1976 Act, the character of the interests R
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intermediary generation while allowing the intermediate generation
to collect income or exhibit power over the trust during its life.
This practice is known as a generation-skipping transfer.
A generation-skipping transfer [is] defined as one which split[s]
the enjoyment and ownership of property between two individu-
als.  The first level of beneficiaries, usually the donor’s children,
received the right to use and benefit from property during their
lifetime.  The second level of beneficiaries, usually the settlor’s
grandchildren, received the out-right ownership of the property
at the termination of the interests of the first level of
beneficiaries.55
The GSTT taxed trust property as if “it had passed through the
estate of the skipped generation.”56  The GSTT imposed a tax on
“taxable terminations” and “taxable distributions.”57  Dr. Dennis
R. Lassila, a leading tax professor,58 defines “taxable termination”
and “taxable distribution” as follows:
[A] taxable termination is the complete termination of the inter-
ests or powers of the last person belonging to a generation
younger than that of the grantor when there are trust benefi-
ciaries belonging to even a younger generation at the time.  A
taxable distribution is a distribution by the trust of other than
trust income to a beneficiary more than one generation younger
than the grantor when at least one person in an older generation,
held by the different beneficiaries had resulted in estate or gift taxation of the property
to the donor and the ultimate, second level of beneficiaries, but not the intervening,
first level of beneficiaries.” LUCKEY, supra note 52, at 14.  The GSTT was “enacted to R
ensure taxation of generation skipping transfers in a comparable manner to outright
transfers from one generation to the next, and to remove the estate planning tool of
escaping taxation by skipping a generation in an estate transfer.”  Comerica Bank, N.A.
v. United States, 93 F.3d 225, 228 (6th Cir. 1996).  The estate and gift taxes applied only
to transfers of ownership in property or situations where there was unrestricted control
over property.  The wealthy created trusts that would provide for the benefits to flow to
subsequent generations without taxing the passing of property from generation to gen-
eration. See also HARRINGTON, PLAINE & ZARITSKY, supra note 7, ¶ 1.02. R
55. LUCKEY, supra note 52, at 14. R
56. MCNULTY & MCCOUCH, supra note 32, at 7. R
57. Dennis R. Lassila, Income Shifting and Generation Skipping Under the House
Tax Bill: Simplification and a Cop-Out, 30 TAX NOTES 1147, 1152 (1986).  The 1976 Act
and subsequent 1986 Act “were designed to subject the transfer of the beneficial enjoy-
ment of property from one generation of beneficiaries to another to a tax in lieu of the
estate or gift taxes that were inapplicable.” HARRINGTON, PLAINE & ZARITSKY, supra
note 7, ¶ 1.01, at 1-2. R
58. Dr. Dennis R. Lassila is a Deborah D. Shelton Professor in Taxation at Texas
A&M’s Mays Business School.  May’s Business School, Faculty/Staff Directory, http://
mays.tamu.edu/directory/employees/8/ (last visited May 13, 2010).  Dr. Lassila’s tax re-
search has been published in over sixty articles and fifteen books on taxation. Id.
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but not in the grantor’s generation or above, has an interest or
power in the trust.59
The GSTT applied a tax rate at the estate or gift tax rate that
would have been imposed on the skip person’s estate.60  However,
the GSTT under the 1976 Act did not apply when property was
directly transferred to beneficiaries two or more generations
younger than the grantor.61
Congress recognized that the GSTT under the 1976 Act was
unworkable62 and replaced it with chapter 13 of the Tax Code in the
Tax Reform Act of 1986.63  The 1986 Act made extensive changes
to the GSTT.  Most notably, the 1986 Act repealed the existing
GSTT retroactively to June 11, 1976, and replaced it with the 1986
iteration, which taxed all generation-skipping transfers, including
direct skips—“transfers which directly skipped a generation with-
out the intervening generation enjoying any beneficial interest in
the transferred property.”64  The GSTT now imposes a tax on every
successive generation of trust beneficiaries except where the suc-
ceeding generation predeceases the beneficiary.65
59. Lassila, supra note 57, at 1152; Bohan, supra note 39, at 488 (“For example, if R
the grantor set up a trust for his only son and grandchild, a ‘taxable termination’ oc-
curred when the son’s interest terminated and the property passed to the grandchild.  A
‘taxable distribution’ resulted when the grandchild received a distribution of corpus
from the trust . . . .”).
60. HARRINGTON, PLAINE & ZARITSKY, supra note 7, ¶ 1.02[2], at 1-9 (“The 1976 R
GSTT was designed to levy a tax that was equivalent to the tax that would have been
imposed had the trust property been owned by and transferred outright by each succes-
sive generation.”); Bohan, supra note 39, at 488-89. R
61. Lassila, supra note 57, at 1152. R
62. Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,356 (Dec. 24, 1992) (re-
porting the background of the GSTT).  “The Tax Reform Act of 1986 retroactively
repealed the generation-skipping transfer tax that had been enacted in 1976, replacing it
with chapter 13 of the Code, a simplified tax determined at a flat rate.” Id. at 61,356-57;
MCNULTY & MCCOUCH, supra note 32, at 7 (noting that the GSTT in the 1976 Act R
imposed administrative complexity and did not tax direct transfers which skipped gen-
erations); Bohan, supra note 39, at 489. R
63. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–514, § 1431, 100 Stat. 2085, 2717
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2663 (2006)); Bohan, supra note 39, at 489. R
64. LUCKEY, supra note 52, at 19; see 26 U.S.C. § 2601.  The 1986 Act now taxed R
three types of generation-skipping transfers: “(1) direct skips, (2) taxable distributions,
and (3) taxable terminations.” HARRINGTON, PLAINE & ZARITSKY, supra note 7, R
¶ 1.01, at 1-3; see 26 U.S.C. § 2603.
65. 26 U.S.C. § 2651(e)(1).  The GSTT is not applied in cases where the grandpar-
ent transfers property to a grandchild whose parent predeceased the grandparent.  Ron-
ald Skipper, Real Property, Probate and Trust Law: Should You Be Recommending
Generation-Skipping Trusts to Your Clients?, 70 FLA. B. J. 61, 62 (1996).
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Particular difficulty arises in cases where a general power of
appointment accompanies a trust that otherwise satisfies section
1433(b)(2)(A).  In Eighth and Ninth Circuit cases, trusts that did
not contemplate a generation-skipping transfer were allowed to
avoid the GSTT well after Congress had enacted it, while the Sec-
ond and Sixth Circuits have held the opposite.66  As a result of
these conflicting holdings, the Commissioner proposed treasury
regulations that had the intent of carrying out the objective of the
GSTT.67
II. THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE WEIGHS IN
The 1986 Act contains a reliance exception that exempts taxa-
tion of certain transfers under trust that cannot be amended on the
effective date of the GSTT.  That exception, section 1433(b)(2)(A),
exempts “any generation-skipping transfer under a trust which was
irrevocable68 on September 25, 1985, but only to the extent that
such transfer is not made out of corpus added to the trust after
September 25, 1985.”69  Through litigation, opposite interpretations
of section 1433(b)(2)(A) have emerged when a general power of
appointment accompanies a trust that otherwise satisfies the excep-
tion.70  In 1995, the Commissioner promulgated Temporary Trea-
sury Regulation § 26.2601–1 in an effort to create a consistent
interpretation of section 1433(b)(2)(A).71  The divide between the
circuits lies in the Commissioner’s promulgation of Treasury Regu-
66. See Estate of Gerson v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 435, 437 (6th Cir. 2007); Bachler v.
United States, 281 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2002); Simpson v. United States, 183 F.3d 812
(8th Cir. 1999); E. Norman Peterson Marital Trust v. Comm’r, 78 F.3d 795, 796-97 (2d
Cir. 1996).
67. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1 (1995).
68. A trust is irrevocable for the purpose of the GSTT if it was in existence on
September 25, 1985, unless “[t]he grantor retain[ed] a power that would cause the trust
to be included in the grantor’s gross estate for federal estate tax purposes by” retaining
a right to “alter, amend, revoke or terminate” the trust if the grantor died on Septem-
ber 25, 1985. HARRINGTON, PLAINE & ZARITSKY, supra note 7, ¶ 7.03[2], at 7-6. R
69. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–514, § 1433(b)(2)(A), 100 Stat. 2085,
2731 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 2601 note (2006) (Effective Date of 1986 Amendment));
see Estate of Gerson, 507 F.3d 435; Bachler, 281 F.3d 1078; Simpson, 183 F.3d 812; E.
Norman Peterson Marital Trust, 78 F.3d 795.
70. Compare Estate of Gerson, 507 F.3d 435, and Peterson, 78 F.3d 795 (focusing
on the date of the exercise or lapse of the general power of appointment, which enables
the generation-skipping transfer), with Bachler, 281 F.3d 1078, and Simpson, 183 F.3d
812 (focusing solely on the date of irrevocability of the underlying grantor’s trust).  The
courts differ in the exception’s meaning of under a trust when the trust confers a gen-
eral power of appointment on an individual. See discussion infra Part III.C.
71. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601–1 (1995).
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lation § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(i), which states that section 1433(b)(2)(A)
“does not apply to a transfer of property pursuant to the exercise,
release, or lapse of a general power of appointment that is treated
as a taxable transfer under chapter 11 or chapter 12.”72  The Trea-
sury Regulation effectively removes from the scope of the excep-
tion a trust that otherwise facially satisfies section 1433(b)(2)(A)
when accompanied by a general power of appointment.73
A. The Purpose of Section 1433(b)(2)(A)
The purpose behind the grandfather exception is as unsettled
as its application to a trust with a general power of appointment.
The Second Circuit stated that the purpose of the exception was to
create a limited rule “to protect . . . taxpayers who, on the basis of
pre-existing rules, made arrangements from which they could not
reasonably escape,” not to “allow taxpayers who, in good faith and
without intent to evade taxes, seek to continue benefitting from a
tax advantage that Congress has eliminated.”74  The court sup-
ported its statement by referring to the two other provisions of the
exception.75  Section 1433(b)(2) also provides that
the GST[T] would not apply to transfers made by wills that had
been executed before the date of enactment . . . if the decedent
died before January 1, 1987.  This exception ensured that an indi-
vidual who did not have a reasonable time between the enact-
ment of the law and his death to alter his will would not be
penalized by the new provision.  Second, the effective date rule
allowed an exception for any individual who was “under a mental
disability to change the disposition of his property and did not
regain his competence to dispose of such property before the
date of his death.”76
The Ninth Circuit asserted the exception “was never intended
to provide an exemption from the GSTT . . . where the holder of
the general power of appointment was not locked into a situation
where the GSTT was inescapable.”77  The Eighth Circuit held that
“the provision was obviously intended to protect taxpayers who
had, before September 25, 1985, taken certain irrevocable action in
reliance upon the state of the tax law existing at the time of the
72. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(i) (as amended 2004).
73. See id.
74. Peterson, 78 F.3d at 801.
75. Id. at 802.
76. Id. at 801 n.6 (citations omitted).
77. Bachler v. United States, 281 F.3d 1078, 1079 (9th Cir. 2002).
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action.”78  Congressional records do not express a distinct purpose
for section 1433(b)(2)(A).79  Thus, because of the lack of congres-
sional intent, it will be necessary to ascertain the exception’s pur-
pose by reviewing it in the context of the entire statutory
exception’s scheme.80
B. Treasury Regulation § 26.2601–1
Treasury Regulation § 26.2601–1 provides an interpretive read-
ing of section 1433(b)(2)(A).81  Until the Eighth Circuit’s Simpson
ruling in 1999, the regulation removed otherwise satisfactory trusts
from the exception only where a portion of the trust property re-
mained in the trust following the exercise, release, or lapse of a gen-
eral power of appointment.82  The regulation treated the disposal of
the power as a constructive addition.83  However, it did not apply to
the exercise of a power that removed all property from the trust.84
The temporary regulation required a portion of the property to re-
main in the trust after the exercise, release, or lapse in order to
constructively add property after the effective date, thus removing
the transfer from section 1433(b)(2)(A).85
Following the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Simpson,86 the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) issued an Action on Decision recom-
78. Simpson v. United States, 183 F.3d 812, 814 (8th Cir. 1999).  The court later
proceeded to say that the fact that “the transferor[ ] could have avoided the GST tax by
giving the property to someone other than her grandchildren[ ] is not relevant.” Id.
79. “The parties debate the breadth of reliance the legislature intended to pro-
tect, but the legislature gave no guidance other than its ambiguous words.”  Estate of
Gerson v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 436, 441 (6th Cir. 2007); see also H.R. REP. NO. 99–426, at
820-30 (1985) (no mention as to the purpose of section 1433(b)(2)).
80. See infra Part IV.A.1.
81. See Treas. Reg. § 26.2601–1 (as amended 2004).
82. Simpson, 183 F.3d at 815-16.
[W]here any portion of a trust remains in the trust after the release, exercise,
or lapse of a [general] power of appointment over that portion of the trust . . .
the value of the entire portion of the trust subject to the power that was re-
leased, exercised, or lapsed will be treated as an addition to the trust.
Id. at 815 (omission and second alteration in original) (citing Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 26.2601–1(b)(1)(v)(A)).
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1433(b)(2)(A), 100 Stat.
2085, 2731 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 2601 note (2006) (Effective Date of 1986 Amend-
ment)); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(v)(A) (1995).
86. Simpson, 183 F.3d at 816 (holding that section 1433(b)(2)(A) applies to exer-
cises of powers over irrevocable trusts that otherwise satisfy the statutory provision).
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mending nonacquiescence in the Simpson holding.87  After the
Action on Decision, the Department of the Treasury amended and
finalized the treasury regulation interpreting section
1433(b)(2)(A).88  The amended and final regulation states that any
exercise, release, or lapse of a general power of appointment is not
considered a transfer under a trust that was irrevocable on Septem-
ber 25, 1985.89  Such transfer pursuant to the exercise, release, or
lapse of a general power of appointment is treated as a transfer
made by the power holder and is not exempt from the GSTT.90
The promulgation of the amended regulation was just the first step
in its adoption; questions about the amended regulation’s validity
remained.91
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have rendered decisions incon-
sistent with section 1433(b)(2)(A) and the Treasury Regulation.
The following section details the current split between the relevant
circuits and how each has handled the application of the exception
and regulation.
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS CONSIDER A GENERAL POWER OF
APPOINTMENT’S APPLICATION UNDER
SECTION 1433(B)(2)(A)
A. The Second Circuit Adopts Treasury Regulation § 26.2601–1
The Second Circuit addressed the application of section
1433(b)(2)(A) to a trust accompanied by a general power of ap-
pointment in E. Norman Peterson Marital Trust v. Commissioner.92
In Peterson, the trustees petitioned the Tax Court after the IRS is-
sued a tax deficiency of $810,925 against the estate.93  Mr. Peter-
87. Simpson, 183 F.3d 812, action on dec., 2000–003 (Feb. 28, 2000).  The IRS
stated that it did not agree with the Simpson holding that the grandfather exception
applies to irrevocable trusts that provide a general power of appointment but would
follow the Eighth Circuit’s decision in future analogous cases in that Circuit unless reg-
ulations addressing the issue were promulgated. Id.  The IRS made it clear that it
would continue to litigate its position in other circuits. Id.
88. See T.D. 8912, 2001–1 C.B. 452 (“These regulations are necessary to provide
guidance to taxpayers so that they may properly determine if chapter 13 of the Code is
applicable to a particular trust.”).
89. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 2004); T.D. 8912, 2001–1 C.B.
452.
90. T.D. 8912, 2001–1 C.B. 452.
91. See Estate of Gerson v. Comm’r, 127 T.C. 139, 151-57 (2006), aff’d, 507 F.3d
435 (6th Cir. 2007); E. Norman Peterson Marital Trust v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 790, 796-800
(1994), aff’d, 78 F.3d 795 (2d Cir. 1996); Lanning, supra note 25, at 12-13. R
92. Peterson, 78 F.3d 795.
93. Id. at 797.
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son’s will created a marital trust that provided his wife, Eleanor,
income and a general power of appointment over the trust prop-
erty.94  In the event Mrs. Peterson did not exercise her power, the
property was to be equally divided among Mr. Peterson’s grandchil-
dren.95  Mrs. Peterson died in 1987, never having exercised her
power of appointment.96  The trustees of her estate asserted that
the GSTT did not apply because the marital trust satisfied section
1433(b)(2)(A).97  The IRS disagreed, maintaining that the GSTT
applied because Mrs. Peterson’s lapse of power created a construc-
tive addition to the trust on September 5, 1987, two years after the
effective date.98  The IRS pointed to Temporary Treasury Regula-
tion § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(v)(A) in support of its argument.99
The trustees first argued that the temporary regulation was
contrary to the plain meaning of section 1433(b)(2)(A).100  They
contended that the lapse of power did not “add” property to the
trust.  According to Webster’s Dictionary, they argued, “add” re-
quired an increase in the trust’s size.101  The court disagreed.102
Legislative history illustrated that the trustees’ definition of “ad-
ded” was not consistent with the scheme of transfer tax laws.103  Ac-
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 798.  The trust became irrevocable eleven years prior to the effective
date. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.  Temporary Treasury Regulation section 26.2601–1(b)(1)(v)(D), Example
1, generally states that the lapse of a general power of appointment over trust property
that otherwise satisfies the exception in section 1433(b)(2)(A) is subject to the GSTT.
See Treas. Reg. § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(v)(D) example 1 (as amended 2004).
100. Peterson, 78 F.3d at 799 (emphasis omitted).
101. Id. Webster’s defines “add” as “to join, annex, or unite . . . so as to bring
about an increase (as in number, size, or importance) . . . .” WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 24
(3d ed. 1976).
102. Peterson, 78 F.3d at 799-800.
103. Id. at 800-01.
When the Treasury regulations were promulgated, the Department ex-
amined—and rejected—precisely the interpretation . . . here put forward by
the taxpayer.  In fact, the appropriate interpretation of the word “added” in
the statute was discussed. . . during the promulgation of regulations designed
for the 1976 precursor to today’s GST[T].  The Department noted that “[a]
number of commentators stated that ‘additions’ to the corpus of a trust should
only occur where property is conveyed to the trust from an outside source.”
After considering this view, along with the opinions of other commentators,
and examining the legislative history, the Department concluded that this nar-
row dictionary definition of “added” would not be consistent with the entire
scheme of the gift and estate tax laws.
Id. at 800 (citations omitted).
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cording to the long-standing view that a general power of
appointment is tantamount to ownership of property, any exercise,
release, or lapse of such power constitutes a constructive addition
to the trust and is therefore treated as a taxable transfer for estate
and gift tax purposes.104
The trustees then argued that the grandfather exception’s pur-
pose was “to avoid punishing individuals who established trusts in
reliance on the old legal rules.”105  The court disagreed, finding that
the purpose of the exception was to protect taxpayers who made
arrangements based on then-existing rules and could not reasonably
escape from such arrangements.106  Mr. Peterson’s trust provided a
general power of appointment that Mrs. Peterson had the option to
exercise so as to modify the trust and avoid the GSTT.107
The Second Circuit held Temporary Treasury Regulation
§ 26.2601–1(b)(1)(v)(A) as a valid interpretation of section
1433(b)(2)(A).108  Accordingly, the transfer was not exempt due to
the power of appointment; the lapse created a constructive addition
to the trust.109  The court adopted a narrow view of the exception.
It would only apply to irrevocable trusts that could not be reasona-
bly amended to comply with the GSTT.110  As a result, the estate
104. Id. (“For tax purposes, a general power of appointment has for many, many
years been viewed as essentially identical to outright ownership of the property.”).  Es-
sentially, the courts view the constructive addition in the following manner: the grant of
power removes the property from the trust into the possession of the power holder.
When the holder of the general power of appointment refuses to exercise that power
and allows it to lapse, this property is transferred back into the trust and dispersed
through it: thus, creating a constructive addition to the original trust.  Estate of Gerson
v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 435, 440-41 (6th Cir. 2007).
105. Peterson, 78 F.3d at 801.
106. Id. at 801.  Mr. Peterson died before the promulgation of the GSTT, in-
tending the trust property to benefit his grandchildren. Id. at 797.
107. Id. at 801-02.  The court’s holding was bolstered by the fact that section
1433(b)(2)(B) exempted the application of the GSTT to testamentary transfers exe-
cuted prior to the enactment of the GSTT if the testator died before January 1, 1987,
“ensur[ing] that an individual who did not have a reasonable time between the enact-
ment of the law and his death to alter his will would not be penalized by the new
provision.” Id. at 801 n.6.  Section 1433(b)(2)(C) similarly supported the court’s hold-
ing by stating that the GSTT would not apply “for any individual who was ‘under a
mental disability to change the disposition of his property and did not regain his compe-
tence to dispose of such property before the date of his death.’” Id. at 802 n.6 (citation
omitted).
108. Id. at 802.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 801-02.
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was taxed in excess of $800,000 for executing a generation-skipping
transfer.111
B. The Pendulum Swings in Favor of Section 1433(b)(2)(A)’s
Facial Meaning
The Eighth Circuit in Simpson v. United States addressed the
issue in 1999.112  There, Mrs. Simpson113 received a general power
of appointment over a trust created by Mr. Simpson.114  Unlike the
Second Circuit in Peterson, Mrs. Simpson exercised her power in
favor of her grandchildren, rather than allowing it to lapse.115  Sid-
ing with the taxpayer, the court concluded that the plain language
of section 1433(b)(2)(A) exempted transfers effected by the exer-
cise of a general power of appointment if the underlying trust satis-
fied the irrevocability and effective date requirements stated in the
statutory provision.116
The taxpayer argued that the relevant action to which the ex-
ception’s effective date provision applied was the creation date of
the trust.117  Mr. Simpson’s trust became irrevocable upon his death
in 1966, almost twenty years before the GSTT’s effective date pro-
vision.118  The IRS asserted that the relevant action, the exercise of
the general power of appointment, was not completed until eight
years after the effective date.119  The Eighth Circuit found the IRS’s
argument misplaced because the plain meaning of the exception
could not support such an assertion.120  Recalling the language of
section 1433(b)(2)(A) (“any generation-skipping transfer under a
trust which was irrevocable on September 25, 1985”), the court
found that “trust,” not “transfer,” was the antecedent of “which.”121
Therefore, the court held the relevant action in question was the
date of irrevocability, not the subsequent exercise of the general
power of appointment creating the generation-skipping transfer.122
111. Id. at 797.
112. Simpson v. United States, 183 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 1999).
113. Mrs. Simpson became Mrs. Bryan by virtue of a subsequent marriage after
Mr. Simpson’s death. Id. at 813.  However, to avoid confusion, she will be referred to
as Mrs. Simpson throughout the Note.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 814.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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The court acknowledged Mrs. Simpson could have avoided the
GSTT by exercising her power differently, but it stated that this was
irrelevant under the statutory provision.123
The Simpson court bolstered its holding by factually distin-
guishing Peterson.124  Mrs. Simpson exercised her power as opposed
to allowing it to lapse.125  This was a critical fact in the court’s
application of Temporary Treasury Regulation § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(v)
(A).126  The Peterson transfer did not fall within the exception be-
cause the lapse of the general power of appointment created a con-
structive addition to the trust.127  The property that was transferred
to the grandchildren was that portion that remained in the trust af-
ter the lapse of the power,128 thus creating a constructive addition
to the trust.129  In Simpson, the general power of appointment was
exercised.130  No portion of the trust property remained in the trust
after its exercise; therefore, no argument could be made that prop-
erty was added to the trust after the effective date, constructively or
otherwise.131  The court had no quarrel with the holding in Peterson
but distinguished it from the facts in Simpson.132
Following Simpson, the Ninth Circuit summarily decided Bach-
ler v. United States.133  In a factual situation similar to Simpson,
Mrs. Wunderlich134 exercised her general power of appointment for
the benefit of her grandchildren.135  The court held for the taxpayer
and analogized the case to Simpson.136
In reaching its holding, the Bachler court rejected the govern-
ment’s contention that the Peterson analysis controlled.137  The
court distinguished Peterson on the fact that Mrs. Wunderlich exer-
123. Id. at 814-15.
124. Id. at 815.
125. Id.
126. Id.; see supra note 82. R
127. E. Norman Peterson Marital Trust v. Comm’r, 78 F.3d 795, 800 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding lapses or releases of a general power of appointment are constructive addi-
tions to a trust); see also Treas. Reg. § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(v)(A) (as amended 2004).
128. Simpson, 183 F.3d at 815 (discussing Peterson).
129. Peterson, 78 F.3d at 800; see also supra Part II.B.
130. Simpson, 183 F.3d at 813.
131. Id. at 815-16.
132. Id. at 816.
133. Bachler v. United States, 281 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2002).
134. Martin Wunderlich predeceased his wife, Murielle, leaving her as beneficiary
of trust income with a general power of appointment.  Robert Bachler, for whom the
plaintiff is named, was the executor of Mr. Wunderlich’s estate. Id. at 1078-79.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1078, 1080.
137. Id. at 1080.
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cised her power rather than allowing it to lapse.138  The court
adopted the Eighth Circuit’s Simpson analysis, which entitled the
taxpayer to an exemption where the general power of appointment
was exercised under an otherwise grandfathered, irrevocable
trust.139  No circuit addressed this issue again until five years later in
Estate of Gerson v. Commissioner.
C. The Sixth Circuit Adopts Treasury Regulation
§ 26.2601–1(b)(1)(i) and Discusses “Added” Versus
“Under” Cases
The Sixth Circuit decided Estate of Gerson v. Commissioner in
2007.140  The taxpayer challenged the applicability of Treasury Reg-
ulation § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(i), asserting it was contradictory to the
plain language of section 1433(b)(2)(A).141  The court disagreed
and applied Chevron142 deference to review the validity of the trea-
sury regulation.143  Under Chevron, the court found section
1433(b)(2)(A)’s terms ambiguous and the IRS’s amended and final-
ized treasury regulation a reasonable interpretation of the statutory
exception.144
Gerson reviewed the Tax Court’s holding de novo.145  The
court confirmed the treasury regulation was issued “after notice
and comment pursuant to the Treasury Department’s general au-
thority to issue regulations under I.R.C. § 7805(a).”146  The court
138. See id.  The court stated that “[h]ere nothing was added to the corpus.” Id.
This referenced Temporary Treasury Regulation section 26.2601–1(b)(1)(v)(A), which
created a constructive addition where a general power of appointment is allowed to
lapse and disallows grandfathering under section 1433(b)(2)(A). Id.; see Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 26.2601–1(b)(a)(1)(A) (1995).
139. Bachler, 281 F.3d at 1080.
140. Estate of Gerson v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 435 (6th Cir. 2007).
141. Id. at 437.
142. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Chevron created a two-part test to be used in reviewing an agency’s construction of a
statute it administers.  The test asks,
[w]hether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.  If . . .
the court determines [it] has not . . . , the court does not simply impose its own
construction . . . , [r]ather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on
a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43.
143. Estate of Gerson, 507 F.3d at 438.
144. Id. at 436.
145. Id. at 438.
146. Id. at 437-38.  Section 7805(a) reads,
Except where such authority is expressly given by this title to any person other
than an officer or employee of the Treasury Department, the Secretary shall
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further held that a regulation promulgated pursuant to notice and
comment has the force of law, and it must be sustained unless
clearly unreasonable or if Congress has addressed the precise ques-
tion at issue.147  It then addressed the first step in the Chevron anal-
ysis and found that section 1433(b)(2)(A) was ambiguous due to the
differing meanings applied to the word “under” in the statutory
provision.148  The taxpayer argued that the transfer occurred under
the trust, which granted the general power of appointment.149  The
Commissioner argued that the transfer occurred under Mrs. Ger-
son’s will, not under the trust.150
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis of the first factor by re-
viewing the two lines of reasoning other courts had used—“added”
and “under.”151  The “added” line of cases addressed the lapse of
the holder’s general power of appointment.152  Three transfers re-
sult from a lapsed power and create an addition of trust property
after the effective date.153  The creation of the power amounts to
the first transfer; the power holder is treated as the owner of the
trust property for tax purposes.154  The lapse triggers the second
transfer as the assets flow back through the trust, leading to the
third transfer as the property reaches the intended skip persons
under the trust’s terms.155 Peterson is an illustration of an “added”
prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title,
including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason of any altera-
tion of law in relation to internal revenue.
26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2006).
147. Estate of Gerson, 507 F.3d at 438.
148. Id. at 441.  The taxpayer reads “under” in the statutory provision as implying
that the trust is the root of the general power of appointment and exercises of power
fall under the trust.  The Commissioner reads the provision as transfers by exercise of
the power not occurring under the trust creating the power of appointment but rather
under the instrument exercising the power of appointment. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 440-41.
154. Id.
First, a decedent’s taxable estate includes assets over which the decedent had a
power of appointment on the date of death. . . . Though . . . the holder of the
. . . power may not have the right to use the property, the [code] treats the
power . . . as if it were full ownership [over the property].
Id. at 439; see also 26 U.S.C. § 2041(a)(2) (2006); Estate of Kurz v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.
44, 47-48 (1993) (discussing general power of appointment as part of the estate); E.
Norman Peterson Marital Trust v. Comm’r, 78 F.3d 795, 800 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating
general power of appointment is “essentially identical to outright ownership of the
property”).
155. Estate of Gerson, 507 F.3d at 441.
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case, which results in a “constructive addition” to the trust and thus
does not satisfy section 1433(b)(2)(A).156  In contrast, Gerson,
Simpson, and Bachler involved the exercise of a general power of
appointment and are therefore classified “under” cases.157
In “under” cases, an exercise of a power of appointment occurs
“under” a trust that was irrevocable on the effective date.  “Under”
cases effect two transfers.158  “In the first transfer, the power holder
becomes the owner of the trust assets for tax purposes.  In the sec-
ond transfer, the power holder transfers the assets to a skip person.
If the second transfer occurs after the GSTT became effective, [the
exception does not apply].”159  Following this logic, the Commis-
sioner argued that the property was, in fact, transferred under Mrs.
Gerson’s will, not under the irrevocable trust, which therefore
could not have been a transfer under a trust that was irrevocable
before September 25, 1985.160  The court found the Commissioner’s
argument in Gerson and the courts’ holdings in Bachler and Simp-
son plausible but contrary interpretations of section
1433(b)(2)(A).161  This ambiguity satisfied the first step in its Chev-
ron analysis.162
Subsequently, the court found the second step of the Chevron
analysis satisfied, stating that the treasury regulation was a reasona-
ble interpretation of section 1433(b)(2)(A).163  In support, the court
indicated that the treasury regulation “conforms the grandfather
clause to other elements of the tax scheme,” and that the “other
exceptions to the GST[T] . . . surrounding the irrevocable trust pro-
vision all represent inescapable contingencies that justify
grandfathering.”164
By failing to consider both the scheme of the GSTT exceptions
and the general scheme of tax law, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits
did not appropriately analyze the application of a general power of
appointment to an irrevocable trust that otherwise satisfies section
156. See Peterson, 78 F.3d 795.
157. Estate of Gerson, 507 F.3d at 441; Bachler v. United States, 281 F.3d 1078,
1079 (9th Cir. 2002); Simpson v. United States, 183 F.3d 812, 813 (8th Cir. 1999).
158. See Estate of Gerson, 507 F.3d at 440.
159. Id. (citations omitted).
160. Id. at 441.  It was the trust that provided the general power of appointment,
but the exercise of that power actually transferred the property under Mrs. Gerson’s
will. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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1433(b)(2)(A).  The exception should not apply to trusts accompa-
nied by a general power of appointment, whether exercised or per-
mitted to lapse, because such trusts do not comport with tax law
and the statutory scheme of the GSTT.
IV. TRUSTS ACCOMPANIED BY A GENERAL POWER OF
APPOINTMENT SHOULD NOT RECEIVE
SECTION 1433(B)(2)(A) EXEMPTION
The key issue in this Note is whether section 1433(b)(2)(A)
should apply to otherwise conforming trusts, when such trusts pro-
vide a general power of appointment over the disposition of trust
property.  The following analysis argues that it should not; rather,
the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Gerson should control in the disposi-
tion of the issue.165  This result is correct because it (1) complies
with Treasury Regulation § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(i), (2) is consistent with
Congress’s intent to tax generation-skipping transfers of property,
and (3) is congruent with the narrow exceptions contemplated in
section 1433(b)(2)(B) and (C).
Furthermore, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ application of sec-
tion 1433(b)(2)(A) allows the exercise of a general power of ap-
pointment to disperse trust property to skip persons decades after
Congress promulgated the GSTT.  In support of the estate tax, the
gift and generation-skipping transfer taxes play an important role
by eliminating loopholes that arise through the use of imaginative
estate planning tools.166  The Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ holdings
have construed section 1433(b)(2)(A) in a manner that is inconsis-
tent with the general scheme and purpose of the GSTT and estate
taxation.  The following sections will uncover the inconsistencies
and fallacies relied upon by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.
This analysis begins by examining the Eighth Circuit’s holding
in light of the scheme of the statutory exceptions found in section
1433(b)(2).  The Eighth Circuit’s holding is inconsistent with the
general scheme of the GSTT exceptions.  A transfer effected by a
general power of appointment cannot be deemed a transfer under a
trust as contemplated by section 1433(b)(2)(A).  Notwithstanding
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ holdings, Treasury Regulation
§ 26.2601–1 and the Sixth Circuit’s application of it should prevent
165. Estate of Gerson held that Treasury Regulation section 26.2601–1 removes
trusts accompanied by a general power of appointment from section 1433(b)(2)(A). Id.
at 442.
166. See supra Part I.A.1-2.
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the application of the grandfather exception to irrevocable trusts
that provide a beneficiary a general power of appointment over the
disposition of trust property.
A. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits Take a Stance Contrary to
Treasury Regulation
Simpson v. United States held that the purpose of the grand-
father exception was to protect taxpayers who had, before the ef-
fective date, taken irrevocable action in reliance upon the law at
that time.167  If Mr. Simpson had created an irrevocable trust for
the benefit of skip persons before the effective date without provid-
ing a beneficiary a general power of appointment, such transfer
would be exempt from the GSTT under section 1433(b)(2)(A).168
However, Mr. Simpson provided his wife a general power of ap-
pointment over his trust.169  Mrs. Simpson exercised this power in
1993, and the transfer then became subject to the GSTT.170  In
other words, it was not until eight years after the effective date in
section 1433(b)(2)(A) that this transfer became reliant on the tax
law as it existed prior to the enactment of the GSTT.  Was this the
type of reliance or generation-skipping transfer Congress had in
mind when it enacted section 1433(b)(2)(A)?  This Note contends it
is not under the scheme of the statutory exception.
1. Analyzing the Statutory Scheme to Ascertain the Correct
Application of Section 1433(b)(2)(A)
In light of the general purpose and scope of the exceptions
enumerated in the GSTT, the Eighth Circuit’s application of the
rule of last antecedent171 to section 1433(b)(2)(A) was incorrect.
The rule of last antecedent treats a limiting clause or phrase as
“modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.”172
167. Simpson v. United States, 183 F.3d 812, 814 (8th Cir. 1999).
168. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–514, § 1433(b)(2)(A), 100 Stat.
2085, 2731 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 2601 note (2006) (Effective Date of 1986
Amendment)).
169. Simpson, 183 F.3d at 813.
170. Id.
171. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the rule of last antecedent as “[a]n interpre-
tive principal by which a court determines that qualifying words or phrases modify the
words or phrases immediately preceding them and not words or phrases more remote,
unless the extension is necessary from the context or the spirit of the entire writing.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1449-50 (9th ed. 2009).
172. Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003).
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Though this rule may be helpful in statutory interpretation, it
should not apply if doing so would be impractical.173
Construing the words of the exception “any generation-skip-
ping transfer under a trust which was irrevocable on September 25,
1985,”174 the Eighth Circuit applied the rule of last antecedent to
rebuff the government’s reading that the word “which” refers to
“transfer.”175  It stated the government’s contention was a meaning
that the statutory provision could not bear.176  The court main-
tained that the antecedent of “which” was “trust,” not “transfer”;
therefore the relevant irrevocable action was the creation of the
trust and not the occurrence of the generation-skipping transfer.177
The court’s application of the rule of last antecedent, though
reasonable, is neither practical nor consistent with the general
scheme of the wealth-transfer tax system.  As the following sections
will demonstrate, the government’s reading is more reasonable and
captures the purpose of the GSTT.
a. A look at the context surrounding the section 1433(b)(2)(A)
exception
“[A]ny generation-skipping transfer under a [trust or will]”178
should have the same meaning under all three section 1433(b)(2)
exceptions.
A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clari-
fied by the remainder of the statutory scheme—because the same
terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its mean-
ing clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings pro-
duces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the
law.179
173. See Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1993); see also LAW-
RENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 31 (1993).  “[T]he last antecedent rule
requires that a limiting clause be confined to the last antecedent ‘unless the context or
evident meaning requires a different construction.’  In this sense, the rule is best viewed
as a strategy for interpreting modifying clauses as opposed to an absolute prohibition
against certain interpretations.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
174. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1433(b)(2)(A), 100 Stat. 2085,
2731 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 2601 note (2006) (Effective Date of 1986 Amendment));
Simpson, 183 F.3d at 814.
175. Simpson, 183 F.3d at 814.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 1433(b)(2)(A)-(C).
179. United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. Ltd., 484 U.S.
365, 371 (1988); see Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987); Sorenson v.
Sec’y of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986); Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303,
\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-3\WNE305.txt unknown Seq: 25 18-JUN-10 12:11
2010] GSTT—HAVING YOUR CAKE AND EATING IT TOO 539
Indeed, “identical words used in different parts of the same act
are intended to have the same meaning.”180  Sections 1433(b)(2)(B)
and (C) narrowly apply where the transfer is contemplated within
the testamentary instrument.  Under sections (B) and (C), juxtapos-
ing the words “any generation-skipping transfer under a [trust or
will]” to the remainder of each respective exception—both exempt-
ing generation-skipping transfers where the decedent is unable to
amend the instrument—implies that the “generation-skipping
transfer under [the trust or will]” is anticipated within the instru-
ment itself without the possibility of being amended to avoid the
GSTT.181  Under (B) and (C), if the generation-skipping transfer
was not anticipated within the instrument, the transfer would not
fall within the scope of the 1986 Act.182  Therefore, in construing
the exceptions in concert, it must be inferred that Congress contem-
plated three basic preexisting factors: (1) that the generation-skip-
ping transfer was created within the base instrument, (2) that it
could not be amended to avoid the GSTT, and (3) that it was not
effected by the exercise or lapse of a general power of appointment.
The proposition that there be contemplation of a generation-
skipping transfer within the trust is further bolstered by dialogue
among the legislators in the Joint Committee of Taxation’s discus-
sion on the Tax Reform Act of 1986.183  The authors of the excep-
307-08 (1961); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-
33 (2000).
180. Sorenson, 475 U.S. at 860 (quoting Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank,
293 U.S. 84, 87 (1934)).
181. See Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 1433(b)(2)(B), (C).
182. See id.  If a decedent’s will or trust did not contemplate a generation-skip-
ping transfer prior to the effective date, none of the exceptions would apply because
there wouldn’t be a generation-skipping transfer to tax. See id.
183. 132 CONG. REC. 26,679 (1986) (colloquy between Chairman Packwood and
Senator Bentsen).
Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. President, with respect to the new generation-skip-
ping transfer tax, the grandfather provision of the prior law was intended to
apply to:
A trust which includes a limited power of appointment, so long as the
exercise of the power (including the creation of a trust) cannot result in the
creation of an interest which postpones, or a new power which can be validly
exercised so as to postpone, the vesting of any estate or interest in the trust
property for a period ascertainable without regard to the date of the creation
of the trust. . . .
The concepts of this legislation history have been embodied in Treasury
Regulation, section 26.2601–1(e)(3).
Would the chairman confirm my understanding that the same result
would obtain under the new generation-skipping tax provision.
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tion understood for it to apply to a limited power of appointment184
in conjunction with a grandfathered trust, so long as the exercise of
the power did not extend the vesting time of beneficiary interests in
the trust.185  Judge Thornton explained,
From these statements, one may draw two negative inferences:
First, that the transitional rule was not meant to apply to a lim-
ited power of appointment that ran afoul of the vesting require-
ments; and second, and of more relevance here, that the
transitional rule was not meant to apply to the exercise of a general
power of appointment under an otherwise grandfathered trust.186
Reviewing the legislative history, the statutory scheme, and the
language of the statute illustrates that the Eighth and Ninth Cir-
cuits’ holdings are inconsistent with Congress’s intent in enacting
section 1433(b)(2)(A).  The trusts in Simpson and Bachler did not
contemplate a generation-skipping transfer.187  The trusts did not
become subject to the GSTT until after the general power of ap-
pointment was exercised.188  It begs to be asked: at the time it be-
came irrevocable, how can a trust that did not contemplate a
generation-skipping transfer rely on an exemption from the GSTT?
It cannot, and, therefore, the only logical conclusion is that section
1433(b)(2)(A) exempts those irrevocable trusts that do not grant a
Mr. PACKWOOD.  The understanding of the Senator from Texas is cor-
rect.  As in the case of the old provision, the new provision will not apply to
the exercise of a limited power of appointment under an otherwise
grandfathered trust or to trusts to which the trust property is appointed pro-
vided that such exercise cannot postpone vesting of any estate or interest in
the trust property for a period ascertainable without regard to the date of the
creation of the original trust.
Id. (citation omitted); 132 CONG. REC. 26, 209 (1986) (colloquy between Chairman
Rostenkowski and Representative Andrews) (House expressing the same sentiment as
the Senate in applying the grandfather exception to limited power of appointments over
irrevocable trusts that otherwise satisfy the grandfather exception); see Estate of Ger-
son v. Comm’r, 127 T.C. 139, 165 (2006) (Thornton, J., concurring), aff’d, 507 F.3d 435
(6th Cir. 2007).
184. A limited power of appointment is “[a] power of appointment that . . . re-
stricts to whom the estate may be conveyed; esp., a power by which the [power holder]
can appoint to only the person or class specified in the instrument creating the power,
but cannot appoint to oneself or one’s own estate.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1290
(9th ed. 2009).
185. See Estate of Gerson, 127 T.C. at 165 (Thorton, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 165-66 (emphasis added).
187. Bachler v. United States, 281 F.3d 1078, 1078 (9th Cir. 2002) (wife of dece-
dent was the beneficiary, remainder to those as she may appoint under her power);
Simpson v. United States, 183 F.3d 812, 813 (8th Cir. 1999) (wife of decedent was the
beneficiary).
188. Bachler, 281 F.3d at 1079; Simpson, 183 F.3d at 813.
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general power of appointment and explicitly contemplate a genera-
tion-skipping transfer within the trust terms.
b. A general power of appointment leads to a windfall for skip
person beneficiaries under the Eighth Circuit’s analysis
In the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ jurisdiction, a power holder
over a trust that otherwise satisfies section 1433(b)(2)(A) has the
ability to disperse trust property to skip persons GSTT-free years
after the promulgation of the GSTT.  This ability creates a windfall
at the government’s expense.  Furthermore, it is fundamentally un-
fair to allow skip-person beneficiaries to profit simply because they
have the fortune to be situated downstream from a trust that pro-
vided a general power of appointment.  The reading proposed by
the Eighth Circuit creates an incentive, not an exception, to exercis-
ing a general power of appointment in favor of skip persons, by-
passing the GSTT at the intermediate generation.  This outcome is
contradictory to the purpose of the GSTT and estate-tax law.189
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits allow the GSTT-free transfer of
property to skip persons nearly twenty-five years after the enact-
ment of the GSTT, even where the irrevocable trust does not con-
template a generation-skipping transfer.190  This application of
section 1433(b)(2)(A) creates a much broader “exception” than
Congress intended in the scheme of exceptions codified in section
1433(b)(2).  The exceptions focus on the generation-skipping trans-
fer being contemplated, immutable, and reliant on the pre-GSTT
law within the testamentary instrument prior to the effective
date.191  Congress gave no indication that it wished to construe the
section 1433(b)(2) exceptions so broadly as to exempt general-
189. Comerica Bank, N.A. v. United States, 93 F.3d 225, 228 (6th Cir. 1996) (ex-
plaining that the GSTT was “enacted to ensure taxation of generation skipping trans-
fers in a comparable manner to outright transfers from one generation to the next, and
to remove the estate planning tool of escaping taxation by skipping a generation in an
estate transfer.”); see HARRINGTON, PLAINE & ZARITSKY, supra note 7, ¶ 1.02[1], at 1-6 R
to -7; Bohan, supra note 39, at 486-87. R
190. See supra Part III.B. See generally Bachler, 281 F.3d 1078; Simpson, 183
F.3d 812.
191. See generally Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–514, § 1433, 100 Stat.
2085, 2731 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 2601 note (2006) (Effective Date of 1986 Amend-
ment)).  Sections (b)(2)(B) and (C) provide exceptions where the generation-skipping
transfer was contemplated by the instrument and it could not have been modified to
avoid the GSTT. See id.
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power-of-appointment-granting instruments that did not contem-
plate an immutable generation-skipping transfer.192
The Eighth Circuit stated that “words do not always mean
what they seem, and that they receive their meaning only from the
context in which they are used.”193  Therefore, section
1433(b)(2)(A) must derive its meaning in concert with subsections
(B) and (C).  The immediately preceding section of analysis dis-
cussed the purpose of the exceptions—to protect the intentions of
taxpayers whose irrevocable trusts cannot be amended to avoid
GSTT.194  Trusts accompanied by general powers of appointment
can be exercised to conform to current tax law.
The exercise or lapse of a general power of appointment under
a trust (1) creates the intent or acquiesces to the intent to make a
generation-skipping transfer, and (2) executes the generation-skip-
ping transfer where such transfer was not contemplated under the
trust or acquiesces to such transfer when contemplated under the
trust.195  Where the trust contemplates a generation-skipping trans-
fer, the power of appointment may be exercised in favor of non-
skip persons to avoid the imposition of the GSTT.196  The general
scheme of the exceptions is to protect the reliance of the transferor
only where the instrument contemplates the generation-skipping
transfer and may not be amended to avoid GST-taxation.  The
Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ holdings cut against this scheme.
192. See 132 CONG. REC. 26,679 (1986) (exempting trusts that grant limited pow-
ers of appointment); 132 CONG. REC. 26,209 (1986) (same).
193. Simpson, 183 F.3d at 815.  Judge Calabresi expressed this particularly well:
“Language does not have a ‘plain meaning’ outside of its particular context.  ‘You
should have passed, dummy,’ means something entirely different at a bridge table from
what it means on Superbowl Sunday.”  E. Norman Peterson Marital Trust v. Comm’r,
78 F.3d 795, 796 (2d Cir. 1996).
194. See supra Part IV.A.1.a.  These exceptions “ensured that an individual who
did not have a reasonable time between the enactment of the law and his death to alter
his will [or trust] would not be penalized by the new provision.” Peterson, 78 F.3d at
801 n.6.
195. See Simpson, 183 F.3d 812.  Mr. Simpson named Mrs. Simpson as the benefi-
ciary of the trust and included a general power of appointment, which Mrs. Simpson
exercised in favor of her grandchildren. Id. at 813.  Mr. Simpson did not transfer the
property to his grandchildren; he left that decision to Mrs. Simpson. Id.; see also Estate
of Gerson v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 435, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (had Mrs. Gerson not exercised
her power, the trust property would have gone to Mr. Gerson’s children); Bachler, 281
F.3d at 1079 (Mrs. Wunderlich’s exercise of her power transferred the trust property to
her grandchildren); Peterson, 78 F.3d at 797 (Mrs. Peterson allowed her power to lapse,
sending the trust property to Mr. Peterson’s grandchildren under the terms of his trust).
196. Simpson, 183 F.3d at 814.
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2. The Exercise or Lapse of a General Power of
Appointment Is Not a Transfer Under a Trust
It is well-settled in tax law that the assets over which a person
has a power of appointment are taxable in that person’s estate.197
The tax code equates powers of appointment to outright ownership
of trust property.198  Furthermore, under the gift tax, which shares a
similar role to the GSTT,199 general powers of appointment are
treated as taxable transfers of property by the power holder.200
Therefore, for GSTT purposes, it is the power holder who should
be deemed the transferor of trust property.201  It is unreasonable to
label the grantor of the trust as the transferor where the generation-
skipping transfer was created and carried out by the appointed
power holder.  This proposition is further supported considering (1)
the power holder “owns” the property, (2) the property is included
in the power holder’s estate, (3) the transfer of that property is a
taxable transfer, and (4) the transfer is created or acquiesced by the
power holder after the effective date.
Within the scope of cases addressed in this Note, two possibili-
ties exist for those possessing a general power of appointment: the
power may be exercised or it may be allowed to lapse.  In each
instance, the transfer of trust property to skip persons is effectuated
by the power holder, not the settlor.202  This situation can be rea-
sonably classified as a transfer by the power holder under the power
holder’s will and not a transfer under a trust that was irrevocable by
September 25, 1985.  In transfers of this sort, the trust forms the
basis for the exercise of the general power of appointment in the
decedent’s will.203  The following sections further analyze this pro-
197. 26 U.S.C. § 2041(a)(2) (2006); Simpson, 183 F.3d at 814; see also Estate of
Kurz v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 44, 47-48 (1993).
198. Estate of Gerson, 507 F.3d at 439; Peterson, 78 F.3d at 800; see Simpson, 183
F.3d at 814.
199. See supra Part I.A (discussing the history of the development of the gift and
estate taxes, namely to reinforce the estate tax by closing loopholes through creative
estate planning).
200. Peterson, 78 F.3d at 800; see 26 U.S.C. § 2514(b).
201. Peterson Marital Trust v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 790, 805 (1994), aff’d, 78 F.3d
795 (2d Cir. 1996).
202. See Estate of Gerson, 507 F.3d at 440; see also supra Part III.C (discussing
the exercise of a power as effecting two transfers and the lapse of a power effecting
three transfers).
203. See Simpson, 183 F.3d at 813 (“The trust gave Mrs. Simpson a general power
of appointment by will.”); Peterson, 78 F.3d at 797 (“According to the terms of the trust,
Mrs. Peterson was to receive all of the income of the trust, and was given a general
testamentary power of appointment over the [corpus] of the trust.”).
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position in cases where the underlying trust does or does not con-
template a generation-skipping transfer.
a. General powers of appointment in trusts that do not otherwise
contemplate a generation-skipping transfer
The Simpson trust did not contemplate a generation-skipping
transfer but provided Mrs. Simpson a general power of appoint-
ment over the trust property.204  Had Mrs. Simpson allowed her
power to lapse, the trust property would have naturally flowed to
the default taker provided by the trust terms.205  The trust, standing
alone, was not subject to the GSTT.206  It was through Mrs. Simp-
son’s exercise of power, under her will, that the generation-skipping
transfer was executed.207  Her estate then exempted the transfer
from the GSTT pursuant to section 1433(b)(2)(A).208
However, as the intended beneficiary under Mr. Simpson’s
trust,209 had Mrs. Simpson not exercised her power, the trust prop-
erty would have flowed through her estate and been disposed of
according to the terms of her will.  Had she bequeathed the prop-
erty to her grandchildren as a direct skip, the GSTT would have
applied.210  This testamentary transfer is procedurally no different
than a testamentary exercise of a power over a trust.211  The trans-
fers in both situations are executed under the terms of a will.  It is
both unreasonable and inconsistent to exempt transfers under an
exercise of a general power of appointment while applying the
GSTT to testamentary transfers not effectuated by a power, espe-
cially considering that the transfers are created by the same person
and the beneficiaries are the same.
This Note argues that section 1433(b)(2)(A) should not apply
to irrevocable trusts accompanied by a general power of appoint-
ment because it elevates form over substance.  In this situation, the
exception creates a windfall to those who are fortunate enough to
204. Simpson, 183 F.3d at 813.
205. Id.  Under the trust terms, Mrs. Simpson was the beneficiary.  Had she not
exercised her power, the trust property would have been disposed under the terms of
her will. Id.
206. Id.
207. Simpson v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 2d 972, 973 (W.D. Mo. 1998), rev’d,
183 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 1999).
208. Id. at 974.
209. Simpson, 183 F.3d at 813.
210. See 26 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006).
211. In each case, Mrs. Simpson’s will is controlling the disposition of property to
skip persons.
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be downstream from a trust that provides a beneficiary a general
power of appointment to dispose of trust property.  The irrevocable
trust merely conveys a power of appointment, and it is the exercise
of that power that creates and executes the generation-skipping
transfer.  The following section reviews the effect of powers of ap-
pointment over trusts that contemplate a generation-skipping
transfer.
b. General powers of appointment in trusts that do contemplate a
generation-skipping transfer
In situations similar to that presented in Peterson,212 a power
holder’s lapse of power is tantamount to her acquiescence to the
transfer.  The power holder has the ability to change the disposition
of property to avoid the GSTT, and her inaction should be treated
as a choice to transfer the property to skip persons and subject the
transfer to the GSTT. Black’s Law Dictionary defines acquiescence
as “[a] person’s tacit or passive acceptance; implied consent to an
act.”213  The power to comply with the changed state of law having
been recognized, it is neither appropriate nor of sound policy to
allow taxpayers to avoid a tax that Congress has enacted.
Policy considerations support imposing the GSTT to lapsed
general powers of appointment over trusts.  A general power of ap-
pointment is equal to outright ownership of the trust property
under estate-tax law.214  The power has “effective control over the
disposition of the property”;215 hence, the power holder has the
ability to avoid a generation-skipping transfer.  “Consequently,
the power holder has no legitimate expectation of immunity from
the 1986 GST[T] . . . [and] the purpose of the [grandfather excep-
tion] would not be served by providing . . . relief in these circum-
stances.”216  The power holder has too much control over trust
212. See Peterson, 78 F.3d at 797 (generation-skipping transfer was contemplated
in the trust).
213. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 26 (9th ed. 2009).
214. Estate of Gerson v. Comm’r, 127 T.C. 139, 165 (2006) (Thornton, J., concur-
ring), aff’d, 507 F.3d 435 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Morgan v. Comm’r, 309 U.S. 78, 81
(1940); Estate of Kurz v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 44, 50-51 (1993).
215. Estate of Gerson, 127 T.C. at 165 (Thorton, J., concurring) (quoting E. Nor-
man Peterson Marital Trust v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 790, 800 (1994)).
216. Id.  Judge Thornton applied this language as policy support for the refusal to
permit exception to an exercise of a general power of appointment.  However, Judge
Thornton’s concurrence provides just as much support in the context of a lapsed general
power of appointment under a trust that otherwise provides for a generation-skipping
transfer. See Chase Nat’l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327, 338 (1929) (“[T]he non-
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property to take advantage of a statutory exception whose intent
was to protect taxpayers who made arrangements from which they
could not reasonably escape.  Treasury Regulation § 26.2601–1 ap-
propriately addresses and disposes the question of whether the
grandfather exception should be applied to a trust providing a
power holder such control over trust property.
Treasury Regulation § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(i) treats the transfer of
property under lapsed powers as a constructive addition to the
trust.217  Consequently, section 1433(b)(2)(A) does not apply be-
cause the transfer creates a constructive addition of property to the
trust after the effective date.218  The treasury regulation appropri-
ately recognizes the unfettered control over the disposition of prop-
erty the power holder maintains and correctly applies the GSTT to
lapsed general powers of appointment.
3. Federal Circuits Should Adopt Treasury Regulation
§ 26.2601–1
The last four sentences of Treasury Regulation § 26.2601–1(b)
(1)(i) were not in effect at the time of the Eighth Circuit’s opin-
ion,219 and the Ninth Circuit did not opine on the application of the
amended and final regulation in its 2002 ruling.220  The amendment,
in relevant part, reads as follows:
Further, [section 1433(b)(2)(A)] does not apply to a transfer of
property pursuant to the exercise, release, or lapse of a general
power of appointment that is treated as a taxable transfer under
chapter 11 or chapter 12.  The transfer is made by the person
holding the power at the time the exercise, release, or lapse of
the power becomes effective, and is not considered a transfer
under a trust that was irrevocable on September 25, 1985.221
exercise of [a general] power may be as much a disposition of property testamentary in
nature as would be its exercise at death.” (citations omitted)).
217. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(i), (b)(1)(v)(B) (as amended 2004); see supra
Part III.B. See generally Peterson, 78 F.3d 795.
218. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–514, § 1433(b)(2)(A), 100 Stat.
2085, 2731 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 2601 note (2006) (Effective Date of 1986
Amendment)).
219. The last four sentences were amended to the section by T.D. 8912 and effec-
tive as of November 18, 1999.  T.D. 8912, 2001–1 C.B. 452. Simpson was decided on
July 23, 1999. Simpson, 183 F.3d 812.
220. Bachler v. United States, 281 F.3d 1078, 1080 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We do not
express any opinion on the validity of Treas. Reg. § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(i) . . . which was
not at issue in this case.”).
221. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(i); see also T.D. 8912, 2001–1 C.B. 452.
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The treasury regulation now applies the GSTT to both lapsed
and exercised powers whether or not the totality of trust property is
removed.222  The circuit courts should follow the Second and Sixth
Circuits’ lead in adopting the regulation.  It appears that the Eighth
Circuit, by its own admission, should follow suit.223
The Eighth Circuit’s 1999 disposition of Simpson v. United
States was the catalyst for this amendment.  The court addressed the
government’s argument asserting Temporary Treasury Regulation
§ 26.2601–1’s import in deciding Peterson but ultimately dismissed
it, finding the regulation, as drafted, did not apply to the facts in
Simpson.224  At the time of the decision, the regulation removed
the exercise or lapse of a general power of appointment from
grandfathering
where any portion of a trust remains in the trust after the release,
exercise, or lapse of a [general] power of appointment over that
portion of the trust . . . [.]  [T]he value of the entire portion of the
trust subject to the power that was released, exercised, or lapsed
will be treated as an addition to the trust.225
Simpson’s analysis distinguished Peterson on its facts.  In Peter-
son, property remained in the trust after the power lapsed, trigger-
ing a constructive addition to the trust in accordance with
Temporary Treasury Regulation § 26.2601–1(b)(v)(A).226  Under
the Simpson facts, Mrs. Simpson’s exercise of power over the total-
ity of trust property left no property in the trust postexercise.227
The court found the temporary regulation inapplicable to its set of
facts since it applied only when trust property remained in the trust
after a power’s exercise or lapse.228
While Simpson did not address the treasury regulation’s valid-
ity, it did state that it had “no quarrel with the holding of Peter-
son,”229 which held that the treasury regulation was a valid
interpretation of section 1433(b)(2)(A).230  This implies that, if the
Eighth Circuit is once again faced with this issue, it would not be
222. See Treas. Reg. § 26.2601–1(b)(1)(i).
223. See infra text accompanying notes 229-230. R
224. See Simpson, 183 F.3d at 815-16.
225. Id. at 815 (emphasis added) (quoting Temp. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601–1(b)(1)
(v)(A)).
226. See id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 815-16.
229. Id. at 816.
230. See E. Norman Peterson Marital Trust v. Comm’r, 78 F.3d 795, 802 (2d Cir.
1996).
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averse to applying the amended and final treasury regulation to the
facts before it.  In so doing, the regulation would remove all exer-
cises or lapses of powers from section 1433(b)(2)(A), irrespective of
whether property remains in the trust.
CONCLUSION
The issue this Note presents is unique with respect to its on-
going validity in tax law.  Yet, the Supreme Court has denied certio-
rari.231  This denial is likely because the issue will die as the number
of irrevocable trusts with general powers of appointment currently
subject to the effective-date provision naturally decreases over
time.  However, the potential impact of the grandfather exception
can result in millions of dollars either going to a decedent’s benefi-
ciaries or to the government.  To that end, it is important to educate
individuals who potentially fall subject to the exception and inform
them of the possible consequences of their actions.
The taxpayer desires tax laws to be construed and applied in
the taxpayer’s favor.  However, correct application of the grand-
father exception must be made according to its circumstances and
the general scheme of wealth-transfer tax laws.  The wealth-transfer
tax laws support the taxation of wealth from generation to genera-
tion.  Reading the grandfather exception in context with the other
exceptions has illustrated the requirement of an immutable genera-
tion-skipping transfer within the trust instrument.
The application adopted by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits is
misplaced because it cuts across these schemes and defies logic; the
transfers made under general powers of appointment, whether ex-
ercised or lapsed, do not occur under a trust as contemplated by
section 1433(b)(2)(A).  Treasury Regulation § 26.2601–1 addresses
the issue in a manner consistent with the statutory scheme and
wealth-transfer tax law.  Treasury Regulation § 26.2601–1 must be
adopted by courts confronted with applying a general power of ap-
pointment to an otherwise grandfathered irrevocable trust to
achieve this consistency in tax law, as it was by the Sixth Circuit in
Gerson.
Robert Kazior*
231. See, e.g., Kleinman v. Comm’r, 128 S.Ct. 2502 (2008) (mem.).
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